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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(g) U.C.86-87 for the reason 
that the underlying cause of action is for paternity. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant (hereinafter referred to 
as "mother") and respondent (hereinafter referred 
to as "alleged father"), formerly husband and wife, 
were divorced in 1974. They had one child, a 
daughter, at the time of the divorce. Approximately 
five years later mother gave birth to a son. Five 
years after the birth, alleged father sought to 
modify the 1974 divorce decree to obtain custody 
over the son. 
The District Court through Judge Russon 
in D14139 ordered alleged father to institute a 
proper paternity action regarding paternity of the 
afterborn child in October of 1986. 
Alleged father instituted the present action 
on Dec. 26, 1986 and gained jurisdiction over mother 
on Feb. 2, 1987. Mother failed to answer and a 
default was taken. Mother immediately moved th# 
trial court to set aside the default. Her motion 
was denied. This appeal ensued. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Mother presents two issues on appeal. First, 
did the trial court err when it ruled as a matter 
of law that the affidavit of mother failed to show 
the type of excuse or inadvertence contemplated 
by Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? 
Secondly, did the trial court abuse its 
discretion when it refused to set aside the default 
paternity judgment? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Mother inspect fully submits that the 
following statutory provisions are determinative 
of the issues to be decided in this appeal: 
Rule 55(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Setting Aside Default. For good cause shown the 
court may set aside an entry of default and, if 
a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
Rule 60(b)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party 
of his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, suprise, or excusable 
neglect;. 
(See Appendix 1 for complete texts). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The facts relevant to this case are as 
follows: 
Plaintiff/respondent (referred to as "Alleg-
ed father") and defendant/appellant (referred to 
as "mother"), formerly husband and wife respectively, 
were divorced on August 28, 1974 in the Third 
District Court, case no. D-14139. (R. 24.) They 
had one child, a daughter, at the time of the 
divorce . (R. 24. ) 
Mother gave birth to a son, David Heath, 
on Dec. 21, 1979. (R. 24. ) 
On March 14, 1986 alleged father sought 
to gain custody of the boy David Heath by seeking 
to modify the 1974 divorce decree D-14139. (R. 
24,24.) 
On or about Oct. 10, 1986, following a 
hearing on Sept. 29, 1986 Judge Leonard Russon 
ordered alleged father to institute a proper pater-
nity action independent of the original divorce. 
(R. 25.) The basis for the order was that the court 
had no jurisdiction over the boy because he was 
not born until some five years after the decree 
sought to be modified became final. (R. 25.) 
Alleged father finally did file a paternity 
action on or about Dec. 23, 1986. (R. 25.) 
Alleged father's attorney contacted counsel 
for mother in mid-January 1987 because alleged father 
had been unable to locate mother for purposes of 
serving a summons and complaint. (R. 25.) Counsel 
for mother ascertained the address of mother and 
provided it to counsel for alleged father. (R. 
25.) Service of process was completed on Feb. 7, 
1987. (R. 6, 25.) 
Because of the communication between 
attorneys regarding her address, mother assumed 
that her attorney knew she had been served, and 
therfore did not notify him of the service. (R. 
8, 25.) A default certificate was filed on March 
2, 1987. (R. 7.) A copy of the default judgment 
was mailed to mother on March 25, 1987. (R. 13.) 
Mother filed a motion to set aside default 
on March 30, 1987. (R. 9.) Mother also filed an 
affidavit in support of her motion to set aside 
default which set forth her reason for failing to 
answer. (R. 8.) 
Even though mother's affidavit was uncon-
troverted, the trial court refused to set aside 
the default, ruling that the affidavit of mother 
did not show the type of mistake or inadvertence 
contemplated by Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (R. 15.) This appeal ensued. 
(R. 21.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The mother failed to notify her attorney 
that she had been served with a summons. As a result 
no answer was filed. 
Mother acted under a reasonable misapprehen-
sion due to the fact that her attorney and attorney 
for alleged father had been in touch by telephone 
on at least two occassions just before default was 
taken . 
Under the facts of this case and particular-
ly because it is a paternity action the trial court 
violated public policy and abused its discretion 
when it refused to set aside the default herein. 
Fairness to all the parties and the fact that alleged 
father would suffer no harm from allowing this matter 
to be litigated militate in favor of setting aside 
the default. 
Counsel for alleged father engaged in unpro-
fessional conduct and ignored common courtesy when 
he took a judgment by stealth without so much as 
a phone call to counsel for mother. 
Therefore, justice would be best served 
by allowing the parties to litigate this matter 
with state of the art blood analysis. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE UNCONTROVERTED AFFIDAVIT OF THE MOTHER 
SHOW MISTAKE AND INADVERTENCE 
The peculiar facts of this case involve 
two similiar rule)', either of which might be disposi-
tive of this appeal. Rule 55(c) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure deals with setting aside an entry of 
default. Rule 60(b) involves setting aside a default 
judgment. 
When the mother filed her motion to set 
aside default and default judgment on March 30, 
1986 a certificate of default was filed however 
a default judgment had not been entered. (R. 7.) 
Judgment was taken on April 3, 1986 during the 
interlude between the filing of the motion to set 
aside default and the hearing on the motion. (R. 
12.) Therefore, it appears that this court may 
dispose of this matter by either of the cited rules. 
Rules 55(c) requires "good cause" to set 
aside an entry of default. Rule 60(b)(1) requires 
mistake, inadvertence, suprise or excusable neglect. 
The general rules regarding relief from 
default judgments are well settled. In State v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme 
Court summarized by stating, "We are in accord gener-
6 
ally with the doctrine ...that the courts should 
be liberal in granting relief against judgment by 
default to the end that controversies may be tried 
on the merits.fT Id. at 1055. The court went on 
to state, "In order to be relieved from default 
judgment, he must not only show that the judgment 
was entered against him through excusable neglect 
(or any other reason specified in Rule 60(b)), he 
must also show that his motion was timely, and that 
he had a meritorious defense to the action.?f Id. 
at 1055-56. 
The trial court ruled that the affidavit 
of defendant did not show the type of mistake con-
templated by Rule 60(b). (R. 15.) The mother 
asserts that said ruling was gross error . 
With respect to mistake, it is generally 
incumbent upon the defaulting party to show that 
his mistake was one of fact, and not of law. 49 
C.J.S. Judgments §334(n)(2)(a). Even a cursory 
reading of the mother's affidavit (see appendix 
2 . ) and the record on appeal shows that the mother 
was operating under the mistaken impression that 
her attorney knew that she had been served and would 
therefore file a timely answer. (R. 8.) Such a 
misapprehension by a client falls clearly into the 
category of mistake of fact, and not of law. 
7 
In order for inadvertence so serve as a 
ground for relief, the inadvertence must be based 
upon more than forgetfulness, and must be such as 
might be expected on the part of a reasonably prudent 
person under the circumstances. 49 C.J.S. Judgments 
§334(n)(4). The primary inquiry as respects inadver-
tence is whether a reasonable man similiarly situated 
might be expected to make a similiar error. 
The record shows that counsel for both 
parties had conversed by telephone on at least two 
occassions in mid-January 1987 regarding the instant 
paternity action. (R. 25.) 
The mother provided her address to her 
attorney and it was duly forwarded to counsel for 
the alleged father. (R. 25.) The conduct of the 
mother was clearly forthright and sincere and done 
in anticipation that litigation would ensue. 
The relevant portion of the mother's 
affidavit reads as follows: "2. No answer was 
filed in this case because I assumed my attorney 
knew that I had been served so I failed to inform 
him that I had been served until March 26, 1987." 
(R. 8.) 
It is beyond dispute that mother strenuously 
resisted alleged father's wrongful attempt to modify 
the custody decree entered in 1974. (R. 25.) 
Alleged counsel and his attorney were therefore 
8 
on notice that the mother wanted to litigate the 
paternity issue. 
Once ordered to do so, alleged father delay-
ed for nearly three months before filing the pater-
nity action. (R. 2.) It was nearly six more weeks 
before the mother was served with a summons on Feb. 
7, 1987. (R. 6.) 
The long periods of delay coupled with 
the fact that counsel for both parties had been 
in touch by telephone on at least two occassions 
in mid-January 1987 set a scenario in which a reason-
able person under similar circumstances would mis-
takenly believe that their attorney was aware of 
the lawsuit and would file a timely answer. 
The mother acted quite reasonably under 
the circumstances. Once she learned of the default 
she immediately contacted her attorney and a motion 
to set aside default was filed within five days 
of the date the judgment was mailed to her. (R. 
9.) 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT 
"The decision to relieve a party 
from a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) is subject 
to the discretion of the trial court. But discretion 
should be exercised in furtherance of justice and 
should incline towards granting relief in a doubtful 
case to the end that the party may have a hearing." 
Helsesen v. Inyansumia, 636 P.2d 1079,1081 (Utah 
1981) . 
In May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109 (Utah 
1984) the Utah Supreme Court stated with respect 
to setting aside a default that, "On appeal, we 
should not reverse the trial court's determination 
unless it is arbitray, capricious, or not based 
on adequate findings of fact or on the law." Id. 
at 1110. 
It is also well settled in Utah law that 
default judgments are not favored, especially if 
they can be set aside without serious injustice 
to the other party. In Interstate Excavating v. 
Agla Development, 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980) it was 
stated that, "The uniformly acknowledged policy 
of the law is to accord litigants the opportunity 
for a hearing on the merits, when this can be done 
without serious injustice to the other party. To 
10 
that end, the courts are generally indulgent toward 
the setting aside of deault judgments where there 
is reasonable justification or excuse for the defen-
dant's failure to appear, and when timely application 
is made to set it aside. Consistent with the object-
ive just stated, where there is doubt about whether 
a default should be set aside, the doubt should 
be resolved in favor of doing so . ..". Id. at 371. 
Appellant herein (mother) asserts that 
the trial court abused its discretion because its 
finding that there was no mistake or inadvertence 
was without a legal or factual basis, and was there-
fore arbitrary and capricious as well as unfair 
to the mother and the child. 
In the 1981 case of Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 
636 P. 2d 1079,1081 the Utah Supreme Court faced 
a problem similiar to this appeal. In Helgesen 
a default was taken even though discussions were 
ongoing through the parties' agents. Said the court 
at 1081, "the plaintiff's attorney ... proceeded 
. . . to have the default of the defendant entered 
in the case without so little as a phone call to 
the adjustor." The court continued, "Common courtesy 
and ordinary professional conduct dictate that before 
proceeding to the court the attorney should have 
made contact with the adjustor with whom he had 
been dealing for so long, and to have made inquiry 
11 
as to why an answer had not been filed." Id. at 
1081. 
Although a different cause of action was 
involved herein the procedural background of Helgesen 
was very similiar to that of this appea[L. 
The mother's attorney had been with with 
alleged fatherTs attorney for many months, in a 
dispute that spanned two separate action. (R. 24,25.) 
Counsel for alleged father even called counsel for 
mother in mid-January 1987 to obtain the address 
of mother. (R. 25.) Counsel for mother provided 
the address to counsel for alleged father. (R. 
25.) 
What did counsel for alleged father do 
when no answer was filed? Did he have the common 
courtesy and professional integrity to make a simple 
telephone call to mother's counsel in order to 
inquire as to why no answer had been filed as 
outlined in the Helgesen case? No, counsel for 
alleged father proceeded to take a default by 
stealth. (R. 7.) He never even mailed a copy of 
the default certificate or the default judgment 
to mother's counsel. (R. 7,12.) 
The Helgesen court also stated that, TTit 
is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion 
12 
to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there 
is reasonable justification or excuse and timely 
application is made to set it aside.ff Id, at 1081. 
The action of the trial court was not only 
unfair, it was contrary to public policy. In Larson 
v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52,54 (Utah 1984) Utah adopted 
the position that default judgments in a paternity 
action are not favored. Said the court, "Since 
such a determination could have important conse-
quences for the child in the future, that determinat-
ion should be made, even in default proceedings, 
on the basis of reliable blood tests, if possible, 
In the instant case the trial court made 
an adjudication of paternity without any blood test 
at all even though all parties were before the court 
and blood tests could have been ordered as a matter 
of course. 
13 
CONCLUSION 
That the mother established mistake and 
inadvertence in her affidavit is quite clearly beyond 
dispute. That being the case, the other issue is 
whether or not, under the facts of this case, the 
trial court abuse its discretion. 
The case cited herein outline a number 
of factors to be considered once a party in default 
make the threshold showing of excuse, meritorious 
defense and a timely motion. 
Fairness and due process of law favor liti-
gation on the merits when it can be done without 
injustice to the other side. If this default were 
set aside, alleged father would not suffer. In 
fact, he would benefit if the case were litigated 
and the proper blood analysis performed by competent 
pathology experts. With blood tests, the father 
will know with certainty whether he is in fact the 
father of the boy whose paternity is in dispute. 
As the case now stands, all the alleged father knows 
for certain is that his attorney was able to obtain 
a judgment without any factual basis to support 
it. 
If the default is set aside and the matter 
14 
is fully and fairly litigated, all of the parties, 
including the boy, will be able to make an intell-
igent and rational determination based upon the 
latest scientific methods, rather than by stealth 
and suprise. 
Fairness also requires that borderline 
cases be resolved in favor of setting aside the 
default• 
Public policy requires blood tests in pater-
nity cases, even in default paternity cases. The 
trial court committed clear error when it adjudicated 
paternity without the standard blood test. 
The lack of common courtesy and professional 
conduct by counsel for alleged father in obtaining 
the default judgment without so much as a phone 
call to mother's attorney should not be rewarded 
by the Utah Court of Appeal. 
Justice, the needs of the child, the facts, 
the conduct of the parties and public policy all 
demand that this case be remaned for a full and 
fair trial on the merits or such other proceedings 
as are proper after blood tests are performed. 
Dated this 24th day of August, 1987 
>ert Breeze 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant. 
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UTAH CODE 
1987-1988 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure RULE 55 
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry 
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer 
than all of the claims or parties only upon an 
express determination by the court that there is no 
just reason for delay and upon an express direction 
for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such 
determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adju-
dicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilites of fewer than all the parties shall not ter-
minate the action as to any of the claims or parties, 
and the order or other form of decision is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabi-
lities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for Judgment. 
(1) Generally. 
Except as to a party against whom a judgment is 
entered by default, every final judgment shall grant 
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is 
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not dem-
anded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given 
for or against one or more of several claimants; and 
it may, when the justice of the case requires it, 
determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each 
side as between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by Default. 
A judgment by default shall not be different in 
kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically 
prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To Whom Awarded. 
Except when express provision therefor is made 
either in a statute of this state or in these Rules, 
costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing 
party unless the court otherwise directs; provided* 
however, where an appeal or other proceedings for 
review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs 
in connection with such appeal or other proceeding 
for review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. Costs against the State of Utah, its officers 
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent 
permitted by law. 
(2) How Assessed. 
The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the 
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a 
copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file 
with the court a like memorandum thereof duly 
verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items 
are correct, and that the disbursements have been 
necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A 
party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within 
seven days after service of the memorandum of 
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by 
the court in which the judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the 
verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the 
service and filing of the findings of fact and concl-
usions of law, but before the entry of judgment, 
shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed 
on the date judgment is entered. 
(3H4) Repealed. January 1, 1985. See Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(e) Interest and Costs to be Included in the 
Judgment. 
The clerk must include in any judgment signed by 
him any interest on the verdict or decision from the 
time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have 
been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within 
two days after the costs have been taxed or ascert-
ained, in any case where not included in the judg-
ment, insert the amount thereof in a bfank left in* 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the Register of Actions aid in 
the Judgment Docket. 
RULE 55. DEFAULT 
(•) Default 
(b) Judgment. 
(c) Setting Aside Default. 
(d) Plaintiffs, CouaterdaimaaU, Cross-Claimants. 
(e) Judgment Against the State or Officer or Agency 
Thereof. 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided "by these 
Rules and that fact is made to appear the-clerk shall 
enter his default. 
(2) Notice to Party in Default. After the entry of 
the default of any party, as provided jn subdivision 
(a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give 
such party in default any notice of action
 (taken or 
to be taken or to serve any notice or, paper other-
wise required by these rules to be served on a party 
to the action or proceeding, except as provided in 
Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that'ft'is 
necessary for the court to conduct a hearing with 
regard to the amount of damages of the non-
defaulting party., 
(b) Judgment. 
Judgment by default may be entered as follows:, 
(1) By the Clerk. 
When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is 
for a sum certain^or for a sum which can by com-
putation be made certain, and the defendant has 
been personally served otherwise than by< publication 
or by personal service outside of this state*' the clerk 
upon request of the plaintiff shall enter judgment 
for the amount due and costs against the defendant, 
if he has been defaulted for failure to^appear and if 
he is not an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the Court. 
In all other cases the party entitled to & judgment' 
by default shall apply to the court there/or? If, in 
order to enable the court to enter judgment or Jo 
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account 
or to determine the amount of damages or to esta-
blish the truth of any averment by evidence"bV. to 
make an investigation of any other matter/thVcourt 
may conduct such hearings or order such references 
as it deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting Aside Default. 
For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has 
been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance 
with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, Connterdalmants, Cross-Claimants. 
The provisions of this Rule apply whether the 
party entitled to the judgment by default is a. plai-
ntiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has 
pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases 
a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of 
Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment Against the State or Officer or Agency 
Thereof. 
CODE* Co 
Provo, Uuh For Annotations, consult CODE •Go's Annotation Service 
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RULE 60* Utah Rules of Civil Procedure UTAH CODE 19TM9M 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b)' Tteie for Motion. 
X motion for, a new trial shall be served not later 
than ten days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; Time for FHiag. 
When the application for a new trial is made 
under ..subdivisions (1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be 
supported oy affidavit. Whcnevera motion for a 
new' trial ,1s based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has ten 
days'f after such service within which to serve oppo-
sing, affidavits, ^ e time within which the affidavits 
oVopposmg^afficJavits shall be served may be exte-
nded for an additional period not exceeding twenty 
days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the^parties by written stipulation. The court may 
pernut/eptya/fidavits. 
(d) On Initiative of Court. 
Not later4 Uian ten days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial 
fpr/}any reason for which it might have granted a 
neWjtnal pn, motion of a party, and in the order 
shall SDeqfv.the founds therefor. 
(e) Motion to- Alter or Amend a Judgment. 
• Aimotionno alter or amend the judgment shall be 
served not later than-ten days after entry of the 
judgment wo^  
RULE 60: RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR 
"ORDER 
(a) Oerkar Mistakes. 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly 
Discovered Evidence; Fraad, Etc. 
(a) Clerical Mistakes. 
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from 
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court 
at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court 
orders? During' the pendency of an appeal, such 
mistakes <may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed Itf1 the* appellate court, and thereafter while 
thei'appeai is pending may be so corrected with leave 
of the appellate court. 
(b).MJstakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; 
r Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. 
On "motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court 'may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party Tor hi* legal representative from a final judg-
ment,^ order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1)' mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or exc-
usable;,negiect^(2) newly discovered evidence which 
by Jue diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of 
an adverse' party; (4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) 
and'the defendant has failed to appear in said 
action; _(5),tthe judgment is void; (6) the judgment 
hasnbeen )atisf]jed,yreleased, or discharged, or a 
prior judgment "upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application,* ov (7) any other reason justifying relief 
from the operationJ of the judgment. The motion 
shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than three 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken, A motion under this subdivi-
sion (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This Rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proce-
eding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
Rules or by an independent action. 
RULE 61. HARMLESS ERROR 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion 
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or 
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new 
trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court 
at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any 
error or defect in the proceeding which does not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
RULE 62. STAY OF PROCEEDINGS TO 
ENFORCE A JUDGMENT 
(a) Stay Upoa Entry of Judgment. 
(b) Stay oo Motion for New Trial or for Judgment. 
(c) Injunction Pending Appeal. 
(d) Stay Upon Appeal. 
(e) Stay in Favor of the State, or Agency Thereof. 
(f) Stay in Quo Warranto Proceedings. 
(g) Power of Appellate Court not Limited, 
(a) Stay of Judgment Upon Multiple Claim*. 
(i) Excepting to Sureties; Justification; Multiple Sureties; 
Deposit in Lieu of Bono4. 
(J) Waiver of Undertaking. 
(a) Stay Upon Entry of Judgment. 
Execution or other proceedings to enforce a jud-
gment may issue immediately upon the entry of thi 
judgment, unless the court in its discretion and on, 
such conditions for the security of the adverse party^  
as are proper, otherwise directs. 
(b) SUy on Motion for New Trial or for Judgment. 
In its discretion and on such conditions for the 
security of the adverse party as are proper, the court. 
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to, 
enforce, a judgment pending the disposition of a 
motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judg-
ment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for 
relief from a judgment or order made pursuant tft 
Rule 60, or of a motion for judgment in accordance 
with a motion for a directed verdict made pursuant 
to Rule 50, or of a motion for amendment to the 
findings or for additional findings made pursuant to, 
Rule 52(b). 
(c) Injunction Pending Appeal. 
When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory c¥ 
final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying atf 
injunction, the court in its discretion may suspend^ 
modify, restore, or grant an injunction during tbt 
pendency of the appeal upon such conditions as $ 
considers proper for the security of the rights of the 
adverse party, 
(d) Stay Up#n Appeal. 
When an appeal is taken the appellant by giving it 
supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such *? 
stay is otherwise prohibited by law or these Rukltf 
The bond may be given at or after the time of filing 
the notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE OOUNTY 
"H 01 \')ii HINDI rn5!,£RK 
STATE OF UTAH 
«/e-0 L p U r ' CutRK ' 
Gordor 
v. 
Cindy 
L Heath, ' 
Plaintiff, ) 
Roundy, ) 
Defendant, ) 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT 
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Case No. C86-9470 
Judge M.^JL. 
State of Utah ss. 
County of Salt Lake 
Affiant, Cindy Roundy, being first duly sworn deposes 
and says as follows: 
1. I am the defendant in the above entitled matter; 
2. No answer was filed in this case because I assumed 
my attorney knew tha t I had been served so I failed to inform 
him tha t I had been served until March 26, 1987. 
3. I never received any papers regarding this case 
(except the complaint and summons) until March 28, 1987 when 
I received a copy of a Judgment, 
4. I belfcive with all my hear t t ha t the plaintiff, Gordon 
Heath, is not the father of my son David Heath/7* 
Dated this ^3/9 day of March, 1987. Uf f i Jyp)unay 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
March, 1987. 
My commission expires: 
NotaifyJ Public 
Residing a t ^4y. County 
GOOQCR 
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